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The madness of the Nazi and Communist systems which had persecuted him cried out for explanation.
He responded in his own way, not by dwelling on the social evils that he had experienced, but by working systematically to reconstruct the logical foundations of social theory, so that people in the future might better understand the dynamics of social institutions. In this labor, he drew deeply on the mathematical and philosophical skills that he developed in Hungary, during the years when scholarship was not forbidden to him.
In this 1961 paper he sketched the logical progression that led him to game theory. He began with some references to other general structures that he had studied in social science, including those of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons. But he went on to explain carefully why he found the most effective social theories to be those which explain people's behavior in terms of their individual preferences, and this led him to game theory.
The game theory that he found in the 1950s was a new subfield where a small but extraordinary group of mathematicians and economists wrestled with basic questions of methodology. There was a proliferation of different solution concepts, but most of them could be applied only to special types of games, either to games where players' payoffs were transferable like money, or to games where there were only two players. Many theories could yield multiple solutions or no solutions at all for a game. John Harsanyi's view of the field was clarified by his insistence that a good solution concept should yield one well-defined solution to any game. And in the mid 1950s, if you looked for game theoretic solution concepts that yielded unique solutions to broad classes of games, you would find two. Lloyd Shapley's (1953) solution yielded a unique value with any number of players, but was only defined for games where payoffs were transferable. John Nash's (1950 Nash's ( , 1953 bargaining solution did not require transferable payoffs, but was only defined for games with two players. In 1956, Harsanyi showed that Nash's bargaining solution could be derived from an earlier theory of bargaining by the Danish economist Frederik Zeuthen (1930) . Then in 1959 and 1963, John Harsanyi published papers to show how the Nash bargaining solution and the Shapley value could be unified into one general solution concept that could be applied to any cooperative game with complete information. This 1963 paper, with its remarkable unification of the two nicest solution concepts in game theory, was the paper that got me started in game theory. (I still treasure the photocopy of it that I made in 1972.) 3 But this early work was all in cooperative game theory. John Nash had introduced the basic concept of noncooperative equilibrium in 1951, but in the decade thereafter there was very little work in noncooperative game theory. The most important advance in this decade was Thomas Schelling's (1957 , 1958 theory of the focal-point effect in games with multiple equilibria, which he advocated as a better way to understand bargaining in the real world. John Harsanyi responded to Schelling in a 1961 paper in the Journal of Conflict Resolution. In this paper, John Harsanyi argued that the distribution of power that is measured by a cooperative solution concept can become the focal factor that selects among the many noncooperative equilibria of a bargaining game. To me, this paper still stands as the definitive defense of cooperative game theory against the arguments of a noncooperative game theorist.
But, in 1961, virtually all the active game theorists except Schelling still wanted to do cooperative game theory. The advance of noncooperative game theory really began in footnote 7 of this paper, where John Harsanyi promised to show, in a subsequent paper, how the axioms of his general bargaining theory could be extended to noncooperative games.
That subsequent paper became a series of papers (Harsanyi 1962a (Harsanyi , 1964 (Harsanyi , 1966 (Harsanyi , 1975 , and ultimately led to his great book with Reinhard Selten (1988). Applying ideas like risk dominance to identify a unique rational equilibrium for any noncooperative game proved to be a very hard problem.
But as soon as he began to work on it, John Harsanyi realized the force of Nash's early arguments for the greater generality of noncooperative game theory over the cooperative approach. Thus Harsanyi switched camps during the 1960s, and he became the leading advocate of noncooperative game theory. In this role, he began the search for theoretical criteria to select among multiple equilibria, because he understood first that the noncooperative approach could not become the standard methodology of game theoretic analysis without some refinements of Nash's equilibrium concept.
In 1962(b), John Harsanyi published a short speculative piece about bargaining when players are ignorant about each others' preferences. He found some fundamental difficulties here, because the tools of game-theoretic analysis could only be applied under the assumption that all players know the complete structure of the game. So he began to think systematically about how to model incomplete information in games, and he developed his ideas in discussions with Reinhard Selten and the other great game theorists in the now-legendary Mathematica arms-control project. The result was a 4 monumental three-part series of papers on games with incomplete information, which John Harsanyi published in 1967 and 1968 . Here he carefully and systematically showed how any kind of uncertainty about a game should be modeled by bringing the uncertainty into the game model itself. He defined a Bayesian game model in which each player has a set of possible types that characterize the player's possible preferences and beliefs at the beginning of the game. Then each player is assumed to understand the whole structure of this Bayesian model and, in addition, to know his own actual type.
If this approach seemed counterintuitive at first, it was because the initial problem of uncertainty about payoff functions in a game was solved by assuming instead that payoff functions were known in a much bigger and more complicated game. But John Harsanyi showed that, with an additional consistency assumption, these Bayesian games could themselves be understood as conventional complete-information games where the beginning of the game has just been moved backwards in time, so that a historical chance move could be introduced to account for the differences in players' information.
In the later 1970s and 1980s, John Harsanyi's consistent Bayesian model became the standard conceptual structure that economists of my generation used to understand informational problems in economics. We studied his 1967-1968 papers, and they gave us a common framework in which Vickrey's (1961) auctions, Akerlof's (1970) For above all, John Harsanyi was right about the importance of a general theoretical framework for social science. Good applied work in any academic field must stay within the scope of the discipline's basic theoretical framework, because beyond these limits we have only ad-hoc intuition. By working consistently to develop the broadest scope for game-theoretic analysis, John Harsanyi helped to liberate economists from the older limits of price theory. With the general analytical structures that he developed, economists could boldly expand the scope of their analysis to study problems of information and incentives in any social, economic, or political institution. With his contributions, we now have an analytical methodology that can be applied more broadly to help understand the changes of our period, the conflicts between rival economic and political systems, the hot and cold wars, the revolutions and other social crises such as he experienced. Perhaps we can even learn to keep the world a better place than it may have seemed in Hungary in 1944 or 1950. We have lost a great intellectual leader, but we will keep working at it. 
